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War in the Heart and Mind: The Moral Domain of the Guerrilla Warrior.

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

WAR IN THE HEART AND MIND: THE MORAL DOMAIN OF THE GUERRILLA WARRIOR by MAJ Daniel L. Zajac, USA, 57 pages.

This monograph seeks to determine if the moral domain of battle for guerrilla soldiers is different from that of conventional soldiers.

The works of classical and contemporary military theorists address various factors that impact on the moral domain of battle for the individual soldier. These works discuss the moral domain almost exclusively from the perspective of conventional soldiers. As the United States faces the challenges of the post cold war world, the likelihood of military intervention in conflicts involving guerrilla warfare may increase. If established moral domain theory does not apply to guerrilla warfare then new paradigms addressing the guerrilla merit investigation. Understanding what motivates the guerrilla soldier in combat will assist the U.S. Army in the development of tactics, techniques and procedures to defeat guerilla movements.

This study focuses on rural-based guerrillas in combat at the tactical level of war. The evidence includes a review of theory on the moral domain and case studies on the guerrilla forces of the Yugoslavian Partisans (1941-44) and the Viet Cong (1960-75). Classical and contemporary theories describing the moral domain of conventional soldiers provide a base line for comparisons with guerrilla fighters. The monograph employs Anthony Kellett's "factors affecting combat motivation" as criteria in a comparative analysis of the guerrilla's moral domain. Those factors are: importance of the primary group; unit esprit; manpower allocation; socialization; training; discipline; leadership; ideology; rewards; preconceptions of combat; aspects of combat; combat stress; and combat behavior. The monograph concludes that Kellett's factors and much of the classical moral domain theory do apply to the guerrilla. However, while the basic construct is applicable, the nature of some factors is significantly different. The monograph explores these differences and their implications for counterguerrilla doctrine.

Table of Contents

Page

I. Introduction.....1
The Moral Domain.
Conventional and Guerrilla Warfare.

II. Theoretical Perspective of the Moral Domain of the Conventional Soldier.....4

III. Analysis of the Moral Domain of the Guerrilla.....18
The Yugoslavian Partisans 1941-44.
The Viet Cong 1960-75.
Factors Affecting the Moral Domain and the Guerrilla
Importance of the primary group.
Unit Esprit.
Manpower allocation.
Socialization.
Training.
Discipline.
Leadership.
Ideology.
Rewards.
Preconceptions of Combat.
Aspects of combat.
Combat stress.
Combat behavior.

IV. Conclusions.....35

V. Implications.....38

Appendix 1. Organization of the People's Liberation Armed Force.....41

Appendix 2. Three-by-Three Organization of PLA Main Force Units.....42

Endnotes.....43

Bibliography.....51

I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout history prominent military theorists and practitioners have stressed the importance of understanding the relationship between people and war. Despite the emphasis that many theorists place on the moral domain of battle, few of them addressed the subject in different forms of war. Guerrilla warfare is one form of war escaping differentiation in theory of the moral domain. If generally accepted theory of the moral domain does not apply to the guerrilla, then new paradigms that address the guerrilla merit investigation. This subject is particularly relevant given the number of guerrilla wars currently in progress.

Today as the Sendero Luminoso rocks Peru, the descendents of Tito's Partisans ravage Yugoslavia, and Muslim guerrillas threaten a fledgling Russian democracy, guerrilla wars continue to disrupt peace. In addition to threatening their homelands, guerrilla movements menace peaceful nations in close proximity. Every day the potential for expanded conflagrations grows.

As the United States faces the challenges of the post cold war world, the likelihood of military intervention in conflicts involving guerrilla warfare increases. A better understanding of what keeps the guerrilla fighting will benefit the U.S. Army in the development of doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures to defeat guerrilla forces. Unfortunately our current doctrine, embodied in Field Manual 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, pays little attention to the guerrilla's moral domain.

This study seeks to determine if the moral domain of battle for guerrilla soldiers is different from that of conventional soldiers. The breadth of this subject requires limits. Therefore, the focus is limited to rural-based guerrilla soldiers in battle at the tactical level of war. The evidence

includes a survey of moral domain theory and case studies of Tito's Partisans (1941-44) and the Viet Cong (1960-75). Anthony Kellett's "factors affecting combat motivation" provide a construct of the moral domain for conventional soldiers as well as criteria to analyze the moral domain of guerrillas.[1] This study is based on primary and secondary sources recounting the experiences of the guerrillas. There are no empirical data from studies with controlled experiments available to draw upon.

The Moral Domain.

The theoretical basis of the moral domain can be found in the writings of classical and contemporary military theorists. The phrase "Moral Domain of Battle" has its origins in Clausewitz' seminal work, On War.[2] The moral domain is the field of influence that affects the will of combatants. It includes all variables that enhance or detract from a soldier's will to fight. The importance of will can best be understood in the framework of the following equation:

F= M x W	Where F=Force M=Means W=Will[3]

"Combat motivation" is a term employed to describe will enhancing variables while "negative combat stress" is used to describe variables that detract from the will of combatants. Thus, the equation can be expanded as follows:

F= M x (W+m-s)	Where F=Force M=Means W=Will m=combat motivation s=negative combat stress

The U.S. Army defines stress as:

> . . . the body's response to a demand (stressor). Stressors are events or situations that require a change, create internal emotional conflict, or pose a threat. The demands may be physical (cold, injury, disease) or mental (fear, conflict, pressure). Stressors can be positive or negative. Depending upon how it is perceived by the soldier. . . . Stressor plus perception causes stress.[4]

In his comprehensive work, Combat Motivation, Anthony Kellett defines combat motivation as:

> . . . the conscious or unconscious calculation by the combat soldier of the material and spiritual benefits and costs likely to be attached to various courses of action arising from his assigned combat tasks. Hence motivation comprises the influences that bear on a soldier's choice of, degree of commitment to, and persistence in effecting, a certain course of action.[5]

The last line of Kellett's definition broadens combat motivation to the point of encompassing the entire moral domain. As written it includes factors that both enhance and detract from will. Kellett's definition and the factors (affecting combat motivation) he derived provide a useful construct of the moral domain.

Conventional and Guerrilla Warfare.

Conventional military organizations are uniformed forces that generally abide by the laws of war and are employed in overt attempts to secure a legitimate government's political objectives. These objectives normally involve the capture or retention of territory and (or) the destruction of enemy forces. Conventional forces can be employed in all types of conflict from general war to operations short of war. They are capable of conducting operations without the use of nuclear weapons or unconventional methods. Conventional forces do not employ subversion, sabotage, covert or clandestine operations as methods. Unlike guerrillas, conventional forces generally operate outside enemy controlled or politically sensitive territory.[6]

Guerrilla warfare eludes a simple definition. Joint Publication 1-02 defines guerrilla warfare as a form of unconventional warfare characterized by "military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces."[7] Field Manual 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, defines guerrilla forces as:

> . . . the overt combat element of the insurgent organization. The members of the guerrilla force are organized under military concepts to conduct military and paramilitary operations. Their duties usually include all overt actions . . . but may include covert and clandestine operations.[8]

Guerrilla warfare may occur as part of inter-state and intra-state wars, across the entire spectrum of conflict. It has been employed to support conventional forces, as the overt manifestation of an insurgency or a combination of both. Guerrilla warfare is generally employed by the "strategically weaker side" to give it limited offensive capabilities.[9] The guerrilla's primary methods are small unit raids, ambushes and sabotage.

Guerrilla wars appear in many forms. Wars fought for national liberation against colonial powers, aggressors, or foreign occupiers provide many examples. Guerrillas have played central roles in civil wars involving revolutionary struggles based on social demands. These struggles often involve political, ethnic, religious, or ethnic-religious minorities fighting for secessionist or lesser aims.[10] In many conflicts, guerrilla warfare is manifested by commando actions launched by a major combatant against enemy rear areas. This study accepts the descriptions of guerrilla warfare discussed above. Urban guerrillas and terrorists are excluded from the parameters of guerrilla warfare in this study.

II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE MORAL DOMAIN OF THE CONVENTIONAL SOLDIER.

The works of classical and contemporary military theorists address

various factors that impact on the moral domain of battle for the individual soldier. Six theorists who placed significant emphasis on the moral domain in their writings were de Saxe, von Clausewitz, du Picq, Moran, Marshall and Kellett. The works of these authors discuss the moral domain of battle almost exclusively in terms of conventional soldiers.

Maurice de Saxe was among the earliest military writers to address the moral domain of war. For de Saxe, knowledge of the "Human Heart", a feel for what is required to motivate soldiers every day, was the most important element in war.[11] In My Reveries Upon the Art of War written in 1732, de Saxe described a number of organizational and doctrinal innovations, all focused on reinforcing the will of the common soldier. He was prophetic, contributing numerous practical ideas that many armies eventually adopted.

On War, by Carl von Clausewitz, includes numerous references to the moral domain; he believed that moral factors outweighed all others in war.[12] In Chapter Three of Book I, "On Military Genius", Clausewitz described four elements that comprise the climate of war. Those elements are "danger, exertion [and suffering], uncertainty and chance."[13] He returned to the moral domain in Chapters Three through Six of Book III, identifying the principal moral elements as "the skill of the commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit."[14] Together these concepts define the great theorist's view of the moral domain.

Ardant du Picq's enduring contribution to military thought is a compilation of his writings that were published posthumously in 1880 and titled, Battle Studies. His work is an examination of the relationship between men and battle. Du Picq's personal experience, historical studies (of ancient and modern battles) and research (in the form of questionnaires)

lend credibility to his ideas.

Du Picq based his ideas on the beliefs that man is the fundamental instrument of war and that basic human nature is constant.[15] Echoing de Saxe, he saw the human heart as the start point in the study of war, stating, "Nothing can be wisely prescribed in an army . . . without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his morale, at the instant of combat."[16] He explored the interaction of courage, discipline, unit cohesion, morale and men in combat. Furthermore, du Picq explained how organization, tactics and leadership must be tailored (tempered by national characteristics) to maximize soldier effectiveness in battle. He strongly believed that detailed studies of men in battle were the key to developing appropriate military organizations and methods.[17]

Written in 1945, The Anatomy of Courage was Lord Moran's attempt to determine "how courage is born and how it is sustained in a modern army of a free people."[18] Moran derived most of his concepts from personal experience in the First World War. He believed that fear was generated when man's survival instinct reacted to danger. Men responded to fear by making a conscious choice between acts of courage or cowardice. Moran viewed courage as a moral quality and a matter of character while cowardice was a powerful regard for personal safety in the face of the enemy.[19]

Arguably the most famous commentary on men in battle is S.L.A. Marshall's Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War. Published in 1947, Marshall's work was a reaction to the period's emphasis on technology in war. Marshall believed that the human element had been neglected in recent military thought and that masses of infantry in close combat retained great importance in war despite the destructiveness of modern weaponry.[20]

With this in mind he set out to discern "how the masses of our men react in battle and to measure common denominators of our weakness and our strength in close combat."[21] In addition, he wanted to "remark on those matters which are vital to the efficiency of men in combat."[22] Inevitably his inquiries led to an analysis of the moral domain. Marshall's evidence was gathered from innovative combat after-action interviews in World War II and personal experience in both World Wars. As an official U.S. military historian, Marshall interviewed the survivors of small units in Europe and the Pacific soon after their engagements. By piecing together these first-hand accounts he derived simple conclusions that echoed many concepts already explored by de Saxe, von Clausewitz and du Picq.

A recent work addressing moral domain theory is Anthony Kellett's Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle. Kellett, an analyst in the Operational Research and Analysis establishment of the Canadian Department of National Defence, incorporated much of the moral domain theory explored by his predecessors. He synthesized and integrated those theories to define "factors affecting combat motivation." Those factors are: importance of the primary group; unit esprit; manpower allocation; socialization; training; discipline; leadership; ideology; rewards; preconceptions of combat; aspects of combat; combat stress; and combat behavior.[23]

Importance of the Primary Group

Du Picq stressed the need to build cohesion by stabilizing combat groups that fostered brotherhood, professional knowledge, sentiment and unity.[24] He might have been the first to address the concept of the primary group. Kellett's concept of the primary group largely mirrors du Picq's. The primary group is formed by mutual attraction, tactical requirements,

interdependence and shared values. In battle these groups have two primary goals. The first is individual and group survival. The second is mission accomplishment. Social pressure and the physical and psychological support of peers help soldiers overcome negative stressors. Pride, ego and a desire to be accepted by the group weigh heavily on group members. While these groups are normally essential to unit cohesion in battle, they can have a negative effect when they work against the goals of the larger unit.[25]

Marshall believed that unit cohesion helped men overcome the debilitating effects of isolation and fear. The most important factors facilitating cohesion and, thus, courage revolved around the primary group.

> On the field of fire it is the touch of human nature which gives men courage and enables them to make proper use of their weapons. . . . By the same token, it is the loss of this touch which freezes men and impairs all action. Deprive it of this vitalizing spark and no man would go forward against the enemy.[26]

This touch of human nature is maintained by physical ("the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade") and spiritual unity between the men of a unit.[27] Communications between unit members and their leaders on the battlefield is an essential factor facilitating this unity. Soldiers who felt they belonged to a cohesive unit often performed well in battle. A soldier's desire to help his peers, thereby maintaining their respect and confidence, was critical for "personal honor is the one thing valued more than life itself by the majority of men."[28]

Unit Esprit

Unit esprit "enlargens and canalizes primary group bonds" and subordinates primary group goals to a higher cause.[29] Du Picq expressed this in his analysis. "We animate with passion, a violent desire for

independence, a religious fanaticism, national pride, a love for glory, a madness for possession."[30] De Saxe advocated the establishment of unit identities and histories to foster cohesion and esprit.[31] To build an army as a true extension of the nation's will, he advocated conscription flavored by the elevation of nationalism and the honor of military service.[32] Besides outward manifestations in tradition, history and symbology, esprit is heavily affected by "recruiting, training, and assignment practices that personalize the [military] community."[33] Therefore unit turbulence caused by rotation and replacement policies has a great impact on esprit.[34]

Clausewitz equated the importance of an army's spirit with the ability of its leader. The source of spirit was the interaction of "a series of victorious wars" and "frequent exertions of the army to the limits of its strength."[35] Clausewitz believed that "military virtues" -- consisting of "obedience, order, rule, and method" -- were found only in regular armies.[36] Irregular forces substitute "natural qualities" -- "bravery, adaptability, stamina and enthusiasm" -- for military virtues.[37] When Clausewitz defined courage resulting from positive motives -- "ambition patriotism, or enthusiasm of any kind" --, he was describing Kellett's concept of esprit.[38]

Manpower Allocation

Manpower allocation involves the organization, replacement and rotation practices of an army. The structure of an army's organizations can have crucial effects on the formation of cohesive primary groups. Similarly, the balance of manpower and differences between fighting and supporting soldiers can influence unity in the force. As noted previously, faulty replacement and rotation policies can have negative effects on morale, cohesion and

esprit. Individual replacement policies, for example, often result in individualistic goals that detract from unit cohesion and esprit. The importance of enlightened unit rotation policies is critical. Soldiers need time for rest and recuperation to escape from negative stressors, a point made clear by Moran.[39] Moreover, time away from the battlefield allows replacement soldiers time to gain acceptance in primary groups.[40]

Socialization

Socialization involves the transition that an individual undergoes in moving from civilian to military societies. It includes imbuing new soldiers with the traditions, discipline and acceptance of leadership and authority essential to the military. Social and physical isolation from civilian society generally enhances the process. Historically this isolation was prevalent. However, as modern armies grow more dependent on volunteers for manpower there is a greater tendency to accept civilian norms in the military society. Modern recruits tend to view the military more as an occupation with careers and rewards and less as an institution with values and norms that transcend self interest.[41]

Training

From de Saxe to Marshall, moral domain theory emphasizes the importance of training. It should be as realistic as possible and provide soldiers with a reasonably accurate idea of what to expect in combat. Training arms the soldier with discipline, basic military skills, confidence and physical stamina. Training is important in socialization and the creation of primary groups. Battle drills, tactics, techniques and procedures facilitate teamwork and build resistance to fear in battle.

To Marshall, realistic training and its products -- confidence and

discipline -- contribute to unit cohesion.[42] Training must emphasize the stark realities of the battlefield, the need for communication and the importance of high volumes of well directed fire. Marshall believed that well directed fire was decisive in battle and that training was essential to the production of fire. The effective employment of high volumes of fire by the majority of men in a unit was a manifestation of cohesion and individual initiative. Based on his research, Marshall concluded that only 25% of the soldiers in well-trained units fired their weapons in an engagement while the army-wide average was a mere 15%. These statistics presumed that 80% of the unit had the opportunity to engage the enemy.[43] To create higher volumes of fire, Marshall recommended building teams around identified fighters while placing those less prone to fire on crew-served and heavy weapons. Crews provide moral support while responsibility for important weapons appeals to a man's pride and desire to support his peers.[44]

Despite the merits of inoculating the soldier with instinctive reactions to various situations, individual initiative must be developed in soldiers. Du Picq felt that "fire by command" techniques were wasteful, generally preferring the initiative inherent in "fire at will" techniques.[45] Marshall reinforced this idea 67 years later. He firmly believed that discipline inhibiting the initiative of thinking soldiers is self-defeating and that soldiers with the initiative to fire remain active and move in battle.[46] Commenting on unity of action and initiative, Marshall stated, "These two aims are not mutually exclusive; in fact, they are the complementary halves of an enlightened battle discipline."[47]

Discipline

Discipline is enforced by formal and informal means. Formal discipline

is maintained by the rules and regulations of military service. It generally includes a system of punishments to influence the individual and group to comply with the orders of superiors and rules of conduct. In times of great trial these systems can move to the extreme with draconian measures to make soldiers fear the consequences of failure more than battle. While such methods have been effective, they usually destroy esprit.[48] Informal sources of discipline flow from the social pressures of the primary group. The basic human need to belong to and maintain the trust and respect of the group are essential to this form of discipline.[49]

Du Picq repeatedly emphasized the need for individual and unit discipline rooted in moral pressure and supervision.[50] Leaders served to maintain discipline by providing command presence in battle. This presence sustains unit discipline and cohesion by demonstrating that direction and orders exist.[51]

Leadership

In the midst of the danger and friction of battle, soldiers "exhibit a powerful tendency toward inaction and passivity."[52] This is when leadership (particularly leadership by example) is most critical. Trends in warfare have tended to force this burden lower and lower in the chain of command. As Marshall pointed out, communication is crucial to combat leadership.[53] Men tend tc fight when leadership is present and providing them with clearly defined and viable courses of action. This leadership can take the form of the established chain of command or emergent leaders who take control in the absence of effective leaders.[54]

Du Picq and Marshall placed great emphasis on the role of leaders in sustaining cohesion under fire. Maintaining forward movement in the attack

or firmness in the defense requires leaders who direct the engagement from the front. These leaders employ direct communication and coordinate support while their presence has a calming effect on soldiers.[55]

Ideology

For soldiers, ideology can be a "conscious political philosophy" and (or) a "sense of value of their own society and its way of doing things."[56] In both cases ideology gives legitimacy to the cause for which soldiers fight and the "orders given in the furtherance of the goals and interests of [their] society."[57] While ideology is important to the maintenance of esprit, its greatest contribution rests in bringing the soldier to the battlefield. Ideology helps sustain motivation over time and impedes demoralization. Leaders tend to have stronger ideological beliefs and often impart them to subordinates. Mass media communications has gained increasing importance with its ability to transmit beliefs and values (ideology) between the home front and the battlefield. This is a double-edged sword that can reciprocally increase or decrease morale in both areas.[58]

Rewards

Most soldiers expect some reward for their efforts and sacrifices. Rewards take two forms: tangible and intangible. The former includes decorations, money, miscellaneous benefits or captured booty. The latter involves recognition in the form of parades, media publicity, or unit formations. For many, gaining the acceptance and respect of the primary group may be the greatest reward of all. In any case reward systems seldom satisfy the needs of all soldiers and can actually work against primary group cohesion. While the effects of recognition are ephemeral, the absence of recognition tends to have long-term negative effects on esprit.[59] De Saxe

demonstrated keen insight on the need for rewards by describing systems to ensure soldiers received fair pay and promotions based on merit.[60]

Preconceptions of Combat

Shock, surprise and isolation are powerful negative stressors on men in battle. To overcome these variables, soldiers require a reasonably accurate picture of what they will experience prior to combat. Tough, realistic training shapes soldiers' preconceptions of battle, but rarely makes them invulnerable to the shock of combat. Once under fire, interpersonal communications and the close proximity of comrades stiffen their resistance to surprise on the battlefield.[61]

Aspects of Combat

No matter what motivational forces bring a soldier to the field of battle, combat experience will inevitably change his motivations. Fatigue, climate, terrain, nourishment, casualties and success (or defeat) are some aspects of combat that support or detract from combat motivation. Strength in primary group cohesion, esprit, leadership and training bolster the soldier's resistance to the debilitating aspects of combat. Success on the battlefield builds confidence and esprit. Failure and casualties absorbed for little perceived gain undermine confidence in leaders and ideology. Casualties have their greatest impact on the primary group where the loss of respected fighters and friends tend to have profoundly negative effects on motivation.[62]

To Clausewitz, indifference to exertion and suffering is a trait soldiers are born with or gain through training. Clausewitz believed that commanders and leaders at all levels must recognize the mental and physical aspects of exhaustion before they incapacitate the soldier and the army. Because war is

a duel between living organisms, soldiers cannot accurately predict what their enemy will do. Consequently, most actions upon which war is based are engulfed in a fog of uncertainty. Clausewitz believed that this area was dominated by the "powers of intellect" and placed a great deal of emphasis on the commander in mitigating the uncertainty of the battlefield.[63]

Chance can change the course of a battle. In Clausewitz' view "no other human activity [war] gives it [chance] greater scope; no other has such incessant and varied dealings with this intruder."[64] The responsibility for overcoming the influence of chance rests with leaders. They must weigh uncertainties and make decisions during combat. Clausewitz completed Book I with a discussion of the "atmosphere of war" and "friction." All those factors that resist an army's functions "coalesce to form the atmosphere of war, and turn it into a medium that impedes activity."[65] Danger, exertion and imperfect intelligence are components of his concept of friction. He concluded that the only way to overcome this atmosphere was combat experience.[66]

Du Picq's concept of the effect of one army on another consisted of material (equipment) and moral (fear) components. While the material affects the moral, the latter is most important. By attacking or threatening attack, one side gains a moral edg over the other; this moral superiority is crucial to defeating the enemy.[67] Du Picq recognized changes in the nature of war and the need to adjust to them. He discerned that the increasing lethality of weaponry would result in greater battlefield dispersion, increased soldier isolation and wider spans of control.[68] He believed these trends created a corresponding need to compensate for man's instincts. Small, well-trained units employing sound doctrine characterize his solution to the empty

battlefield.[69]

Combat Stress

Exposure to aspects of combat have a profound influence on soldiers over time. Kellett subscribes to Moran's theory that each soldier has a finite ability to overcome the stressors that produce fear. Once a soldier has expended his ability to resist stress, he is prone to breakdown.[70] Logically, extended periods of intense combat can accelerate the consumption of resistance and rapidly bring soldiers to the breaking point. Kellett agrees with Marshall and Moran that a screening process can prevent many men with personality characteristics prone to rapid breakdowns from joining combat units.[71]

Clausewitz believed that the ability to function while absorbing the stress of battle required "self-control . . . rooted in temperament."[72] The ability to endure a single blow to the will is staunchness, while the ability to endure long-term stress is endurance. The ability to overcome emotion is a function of balance in a soldier's character. Clausewitz identified four character types with regard to this balance of emotion: stolid men not easily moved by emotion; active men who are sensitive yet calm; excitable men who are easily and sharply aroused for brief periods; and men of strength and durability who are moved gradually by deep emotions. Clausewitz found most value in men of the first and last types.[73]

Combat Behavior

Behavior in combat hinges on the soldier's instinct for self-preservation.[74] The conscious decision to overcome the fear of death and act with courage is weakened or strengthened by relative commitment to "tasks levied on the individual and the group."[75] Self-preservation, however, is

a powerful motivator when no alternative to fighting is possible. This aspect grows in importance on fluid battlefields where rear areas offer little if any safety. Moreover, when leaders and primary group members demonstrate the drive to survive immediate threats, social pressures bolster the individual's ability to contribute to the unit's preservation.[76] With combat experience, soldiers gain confidence by learning how to survive. This confidence strengthens a soldier's ability to overcome fear.[77]

Clausewitz asserted that courage was the first requirement to overcome fear. He defined two types of courage in the face of danger: permanent and situational courage. The highest form of courage was a combination of both. Permanent courage (indifference to danger) is a matter of temperament, and the most dependable form. Situational courage inspires boldness and may be the result of "ambition, patriotism, or enthusiasm of any kind."[78]

Like Clausewitz, du Picq felt that man's self-preservation instinct (a basic part of human nature) was amplified by the fear, chaos and uncertainty generated on the battlefield. The problem was reinforcing the soldier's courage to overcome his desire for self-preservation. Du Picq described a myriad of interrelated factors that had to be accommodated to build courage. The most important were discipline, unit cohesion and morale. Unit organization, tactics and leadership positively influenced those factors and had to be addressed before a war.[79]

Moran felt that soldiers are born with varying ability to sustain courage in battle.

> There seemed to be four degrees of courage and four orders of men measured by that standard. Men who did not fear; men who felt fear but did not show it; men who felt fear showed it but did their job; men who felt fear showed it and shirked.[80]

Every man has a limited supply of courage that can be exhausted through continuous exposure to fear in battle.[81] The breaking point where an individual's courage is exhausted is brought on by commotional and (or) emotional shock. Commotional shock involves the external stimulus of battle. Emotional shock refers to men frightened by their own thoughts. While courage is not a renewable resource, leadership, training, discipline, unit cohesion, rest and recuperation can bolster an individual's resistance to the debilitating effects of fear.[82]

Like his predecessors, Marshall felt that courage was a conscious decision to place oneself in harm's way, despite fear. In close combat, feelings of isolation, fear for personal safety, fear of killing, lack of communications and unrealistic expectations of combat detracted from a soldier's courage and ability to function.[83] Marshall's answer to these negative stressors was the creation of cohesion in the primary group.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL DOMAIN OF THE GUERRILLA

Despite the importance that military theorists place on the moral domain, none of them -- save von Clausewitz who asserted that irregular forces possessed "natural qualities" vice the "military virtues" found in regulars -- addressed differences in the moral domain corresponding to various forms of war. Perhaps they felt that their basic parameters for the moral domain were constant and addressed all forms of war. With the possible exception of de Saxe, it is unlikely that they overlooked forms of conflict outside of conventional war. Certainly they must have been aware of guerrilla wars in history. At this point their views of the guerrilla's moral domain, if any, elude us. Before applying Kellett's factors to an analysis of the guerrilla's moral domain, the wars of the Yugoslav Partisans and Viet Cong

merit review.

The Yugoslavian Partisans, 1941-44

On 6 April 1941, German, Italian and Bulgarian troops invaded Yugoslavia. Twelve days later Yugoslavia surrendered unconditionally. The major German forces that blitzed through Yugoslavia departed quickly, first to Greece and eventually to Russia. The precipitate Axis sweep allowed many Yugoslav soldiers to escape to the hills with their weapons, shocked and disorganized but still capable of fighting.[84] Twenty-two unenthusiastic Italian and four weak German divisions remained to occupy the country. This force was aided by the Croation "Ustashi" and ad hoc units of Serb and Muslim Slav collaborators.[85] The rapid Axis victory was merely a prelude to a vicious guerrilla war that would last until the invaders were evicted in 1945.

The Yugoslav resistance involved two major factions that fought each other as well as their occupiers. The first were mainly Serbian and Montenegrin pro-monarchists led by Draja Mihailovich. They called themselves the "Chetniks" ("armed band"), remained loyal to the Yugoslav government in exile and conducted operations in Serbia.[86] The second group was communist and, led by Josef Broz ("Tito"), called themselves the "Partisans." Their strongholds were Bosnia and eventually Croatia.[87] Both factions quickly adopted guerrilla warfare and maximized the use of the rugged Yugoslav countryside to resist their oppressors. At the outset the Chetniks and Partisans could muster some 5,000 and 13,000 men, respectively. By 1944 their numbers expanded to 70,000 and 300,000.[88]

From late 1941 to mid-1943 guerrilla attacks brought harsh Axis reprisals and more recruits from the populace. In this same period, numerous Axis offensives failed to achieve decisive success due to guerrilla prowess and

Italian ineptitude. The Chetniks joined in some of the attacks on the Partisans.[89] By the end of 1943, most Allied support went to the Partisans who were seen as the more effective force.[90]

In September of 1943, the Italians quit the war and a sizeable quantity of their equipment fell into Partisan hands.[91] In the fall, the Germans employed 700,000 men in three major offensives aimed at the destruction of the rapidly expanding Partisan forces. Despite tactical defeats, the Partisans survived and grew stronger.[92] In the summer of 1944, the Germans shifted tactics and went after Tito himself. They seized Tito's headquarters with airborne and ground forces, but the Partisan leader escaped to the island of Vis where he continued to direct his forces.[93]

By the fall of 1944, most Partisan units had matured to conventional organizations. Combined with guerrilla forces, they harried the German retreat from the Balkans and assisted the Soviets in the liberation of Belgrade. By early 1945, Tito controlled 800,000 men in 53 conventionally organized divisions. The resurgent Yugoslavian Army finished the war by liberating their country of the invaders while crushing the remnants of the Ustashi and Chetnik movements.[94]

The Viet Cong, 1960-75

The guerrilla force commonly known as the Viet Cong (VC) had its roots in the Viet Minh forces that resisted Japanese occupiers from 1943 to 1945 and defeated the French in the First Indochina War (1946-1954). From 20 July 1954 to the early '60s, Viet Minh guerrillas remaining south of the 17th parallel consolidated and waited for elections while barely surviving brutal South Vietnamese attacks.[95] In January 1958 as Viet Minh guerrillas stepped up attacks near Saigon, Ngo Dinh Diem, the President of the Republic

of Vietnam (RVN), coined the term "Viet Cong" as a moniker for the Vietnamese Communists.[96] The name stuck.

"Viet Cong" is actually an umbrella term for three organizations: the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) formed in 1960; the People's Liberation Armed Force (PLAF); and the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) or Communist Party of South Vietnam.[97] The NLF, predominantly South Vietnamese, included non-communist opponents to the South Vietnamese Government and down-played its ties to the North. In reality, the VC was created by Northern cadres and was controlled (and largely sustained) by the Communist leadership of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV or North Vietnam). The PLAF was the military arm of the NLF, organized into Main Force and Paramilitary units. The latter were subdivided into Regional and Local elements.[98] By early 1968, the PLAF had grown to a strength of 400,000 men.[99]

From 1960 to 1965 the VC employed a strategy that mirrored Mao's three-stage protracted war strategy. As the size of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) expanded and the VC suffered increased attrition, the DRV leadership hastened to reinforce the PLAF. At first, cadres and small elements of North Vietnam's People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) were sent south as replacements for the PLAF. When the war escalated in the early 60s and later with the introduction of large U.S. forces in 1965, whole regiments and divisions of the PAVN moved south to fight in concert with VC guerrillas.[100]

From 1965 through late 1967, VC guerrillas supported the PAVN Regular Force strategy culminating in the famous Tet Offensive of 1968. In attempting to force a general uprising across South Vietnam, the Viet Cong flung 70,000 men into guerrilla attacks against urban areas.[101] They were

bloodily repulsed. U.S. sources claimed 37,000 enemy were killed in the offensive.[102] While attempting to recover from Tet, the Viet Cong replaced the traditional three-stage strategy with a two-stage variant. At the tactical level the focus moved to elite sapper teams called "super guerrillas".[103] From 1968 until the end of the war, the VC would play only a supporting role to the conventional PAVN.

In the spring of 1972, the PAVN employed a conventional offensive that was soundly defeated by U.S. air power and staunch ARVN resistance. In 1975, the PAVN struck conventionally again and what started as limited objective attacks exploded into a strategic offensive. In the absence of U.S. air power, the PAVN forces crushed the ARVN and overran South Vietnam.

While the Viet Cong could not win control of the South independently, their contribution to the PAVN victory was crucial. Despite their catastrophic defeat in the Tet offensive, they successfully convinced many Americans that the South could not win. Moreover, Tet reinforced anti-war factions that convinced an American president to forgo a bid for reelection. Their long-term corrosive effect on the legitimacy of the RVN government and South Vietnamese morale did inestimable damage to a beleaguered nation.

The nature of the Yugoslav and Vietnamese peoples and cultures played a key role in their respective victories. Vietnam and Yugoslavia had long histories of nationalist fervor and violent resistance against foreign occupation. The masses of both countries were ethnically, politically and religiously diverse. Yugoslav and Vietnamese people were used to hardships. Poverty and war forged stoic and fatalistic attitudes in both cultures. On the way to victory, both guerrilla movements maximized their useful cultural attributes while overcoming their negatives. Protracted war, nested in the

Vietnamese culture's long term (Eastern) view of time, was one example. Appeals to nationalism were another.

Factors Affecting the Moral Domain and the Guerrilla

Importance of the Primary Group

Early in the Yugoslavian resistance Tito's Partisans were formed in guerrilla bands built around nuclei of committed communists.[104] These small bands of varying sizes (often three guerrillas) were grouped into small platoons and companies as fast as recruitment allowed.[105] Named after their leaders or localities, Partisan units were raised regionally.[106] Clans and villages provided manpower and injected their friendships, bonds, and biases into the Partisan ranks. Despite their ad hoc formulation, it is clear that these bands formed the primary groups of the movement. Partisan tactics relied heavily on the employment of small units conducting sabotage, raids and ambushes. Inevitably, the very nature of these tactics placed great importance upon the effectiveness of the primary group. While the formation of three-man primary groups (bands) was not standardized in the Partisan movement, the Viet Cong built an entire guerrilla army on the standardized organization of three-man cells.

The Viet Cong formed three-man guerrilla cells (primary groups), led by an experienced cadre member, soon after new recruits were gathered for training. Cell, platoon and company cadres led and trained their cells from conception through combat.[107] This practice inevitably fostered small unit cohesion and provided valuable training for the leaders themselves. The critical importance of this organization stemmed from:

> . . . (1) its function as a "buddy group" capable of satisfying basic needs; (2) its domination by the cadre-leader which ensured that primary group norms would be congruent with organizational objectives; (3) its utility as a basic mechanism for surveillance

and as a source of reports on individual behavior; and (4) its suitability as a unit capable of engaging in modern guerrilla warfare.[108]

The Viet Cong's standardization of the primary group was a critical factor in their resilience and endurance. The nature of their primary groups permeated all facets of their organization. Arguably, the organization of these guerrilla cells made it possible for them to fight the war for as long and as successfully as they did.[109] Appendices 1 and 2 illustrate the primary group concept embodied in the Viet Cong organizational structure.

Unit Esprit

Both the Partisans and Viet Cong employed dedicated leaders to canalize the efforts of the primary group in the achievement of their movement goals. Because the Partisans had to rely on a much broader base of support, their leaders were less homogenous in terms of political affiliation and goals.[110] Despite this fact, the overriding objective -- freeing their nation from Axis oppression -- provided ample focus for unit esprit.

Viet Cong cadre leaders focused the efforts of the primary group to achieve Party and PLA goals (the higher cause).[111] Through the employment of the three-man cell, "the PLA structured and controlled the primary group to a degree equaled in few armies."[112] These cells, well integrated into the structure of higher echelons, were crucial to Viet Cong esprit. Ideology and socialization contributed to primary group cohesion and PLA control over the primary cell.

Manpower Allocation

The Partisan movement never suffered from a lack of volunteers. They drew heavily from former members of the Yugoslav army while Axis brutality pushed vast numbers of men and women into the movement's fighting ranks.

Appeals for the cause of national liberation were made to all minorities and guerrilla units were often raised along ethnic lines. Women's and youth organizations were formed to support fighting units.[113] Service in the Partisan ranks was voluntary and some guerrillas were allowed to leave the movement when they no longer wanted to participate.[114]

As mentioned previously, Partisan bands were organized into platoons, companies and detachments. Eventually, selected detachments were joined to form mobile Proletarian brigades and divisions. While logistics and support units were established, all guerrilla units were expected to (and did) fight as required. Leaders (to include Tito himself) fought alongside guerrilla units, obviating divisions between leaders and fighters. In the early stages of the war guerrilla tactics predominated, but in the later stages pitched battles along conventional lines grew in frequency. Fighting in larger organizations, Partisan units experienced longer battles in greater frequency with fewer breaks than the Viet Cong.

From the early days of the movement until the mid '60s, the preferred method of Viet Cong recruitment involved subtle persuasion and coercion. Impressionable youth were prime targets of this approach.[115] However, as the war intensified, conscription and abduction increased as methods of gaining manpower.[116] While some recruits were promised three-year commitments upon entry, they were often coerced into "service until victory."[117] Women accounted for a significant portion of VC strength and their presence could galvanize the will of male guerrillas.[118] Women and men recruited for the Viet Cong usually started service in local units and, when they proved reliable, moved on to Regional and Main Force organizations.[119] This process, when carried out, allowed new soldiers to

gather experience while providing cadre members with ample opportunity to select potential leaders and useful fighters. Enlightened Viet Cong rest and recuperation practices allowed many units to remain out of direct contact with enemy ground units. The participation of combat leaders (and political cadres) in all activities as well as the rotation of guerrilla units between combat, political and logistics missions mitigated most feelings of division in the ranks.

Socialization

Guerrilla recruits experienced a socialization process similar to that employed by conventional forces. Discipline, the acceptance of authority and guerrilla training facilitated socialization. However, the Partisans and, to a lesser extent, the Viet Cong depended on the support of the local population. Therefore, unlike most conventional forces, isolation from the civil populace was counterproductive for the guerrillas. Within the ranks of the Viet Cong, the primary group and the progressive advancement of capable guerrillas to the Main Force provided useful vehicles for the transition from civilian to military life. The same was true of the Partisan system where guerrillas moved from local bands and regional detachments to mobile Proletarian brigades and divisions.

Viet Cong indoctrination, emphasizing NLF ideology as well as traditional Vietnamese values and characteristics, played a salient role in the socialization process. Indoctrination was just as important to Partisan socialization; however, it emphasized nationalism due to the political and ethnic-regional diversity of their movement. Partisan and Viet Cong recruits were treated with respect and care by their leaders. This genuine concern for the welfare of guerrillas built trust and confidence in the leadership.

Training

The importance of training was never overlooked by the Viet Cong or the Partisans. The problem for both movements was inconsistent and uneven training. Viet Cong training was situationally dependent. For example, at one point in 1966, the 514th Viet Cong Battalion spent only eight days training new guerrillas on rudimentary fighting skills before sending them into battle. When time permitted, they employed a 30-day training cycle that included advanced skills.[120] Some programs lasted up to three months and featured live operations due to the fact that they often conducted training during combat missions.[121] Since most guerrillas started in local units and progressed to Regional and Main Force elements, training would continue at each level.

All Viet Cong training emphasized political indoctrination and a great amount of time was spent on the process. Indoctrination training was conducted on the march and in lulls between battles.[122] Another area of emphasis was weapons proficiency. Viet Cong marksmanship manuals stressed many of the same concepts that Marshall believed were so important. Maximum participation by unit members and high volumes of well-aimed fire were just as important to VC guerrillas as they were to conventional infantry.[123]

Written by Tito himself, Partisan basic training requirements emphasized basic marksmanship, small unit drills, and demolitions. Following initial setbacks, Tito ordered all commanders to refrain from sending untrained leaders into combat.[124] Early on, entry training lasted two weeks; however, as casualties mounted and inexperienced personnel joined the ranks, training increased to six weeks.[125] Eventually Tito directed the establishment of two command courses lasting ten days each. The first was

designed for battalion and brigade leaders while the second was designed for platoon and company commanders.[126]

Discipline

Discipline was a subject that Tito emphasized in orders to the Partisans. For example, the oath taken by new Partisans and the order establishing Proletarian brigades stressed the importance of discipline.[127] "Iron self discipline" was supposed to spring from the guerrilla's political convictions, conscience and devotion to victory.[128] To enforce discipline, Tito established military courts and magistrates. Punishment ranged from public admonishment for minor offenses to death for cowardice and treason.[129]

The hand-picked and better-led members of mobile units appeared to demonstrate more discipline than local guerrillas. However, while discipline under fire does not appear to have been a major problem, excesses outside combat were. Civilians of various ethnic groups were often at the mercy of guerrillas from different origins. This is an example of primary groups working against the higher cause. The mistreatment (often execution) of captured Chetniks and Axis soldiers was commonplace despite Tito's orders to the contrary.[130]

Viet Cong guerrillas indicate that discipline in many units was situationally dependent, sometimes draconian, but most often affected through a lenient system of moral persuasion. Occasionally, minor transgressions were punished by execution, but most offenders were subjected to simple counseling and reeducation. Some Viet Cong deserters (including multiple offenders) recovered by their units were simply placed back in the ranks. Such leniency depended on the attitude of the unit cadre; however, its existence certainly dispels the image of routinely brutal discipline.

Apparently, the need for acceptance and respect from the primary group was the most important factor in Viet Cong combat discipline.[131]

Leadership

In the Partisan and Viet Cong movements, dedicated leaders were decisive in maintaining cohesion and accomplishing missions. Acting as conduits of esprit, teachers, role models and combat leaders, unit cadres were the glue that held the guerrilla units together. Much of the Viet Cong leadership consisted of former Viet Minh while many Partisan leaders were veterans of the Spanish Civil War.[132] In both cases they brought a wealth of combat experience to their movements.

Most guerrillas (particularly Viet Cong) had great confidence and trust in their leaders. Of particular note is the fact that Viet Cong and Partisan Cadres led from the front and endured all the privations experienced by their subordinates.[133] Viet Cong guerrillas held their leaders in high esteem for their experience, bravery and prowess in battle.[134] This held true for the Viet Cong political cadres that periodically toured guerrilla cells.[135]

Ideology

The ideologies of the Partisan and Viet Cong movements were based on appeals to nationalism for similar reasons. Given the political and ethnic diversity of Yugoslavia, the Partisans had little choice. In August of 1941 Tito wrote:

> The Partisan detachments are called national liberation partisan detachments because they are not fighting units belonging to any particular political party . . . rather they are fighting units of the nations of Yugoslavia which ought to be joined by all patriots capable of bearing arms against the invaders, regardless of their political convictions.[136]

The Partisan ideology essentially called for a national crusade to evict the

Axis occupiers. Moreover, old Balkan traditions — guerrilla warfare and acts of banditry against oppressive governments — combined with nationalism formed a potent motivating force.[137] Despite some misgivings by hardened communists, this broad-based approach was rapidly accepted and carried the movement throughout the war. Tito's call for unity had the added benefit of discrediting the Chetniks who collaborated with the Axis and attacked the Partisans. Moreover, this nationalist ideology was instrumental in attracting Western support.

Both conscious political philosophy and the values of Vietnamese society were the bedrock of Viet Cong ideology. Cell leaders and political cadres imbued guerrillas with NLF ideology, employing a broad-based appeal to accommodate the wide spectrum of recruits. The four major points of the NLF ideology reflect this approach.

> . . . (1) to save the nation (that is, save it "from U.S. aggressors"); (2) to work for reunification of the fatherland; (3) to build an independent, democratic, peaceful, neutral, and prosperous Vietnam, and (4) to apply a foreign policy of "peace and neutrality."[138]

Values of Vietnamese society contributed to the overall NLF ideology. These values included independence and nationalism as well as cultural characteristics such as "fatalism, respect for elders, face [pride, ego, respect] and the Vietnamese view of death."[139] The nationalistic appeal was designed to disguise Viet Cong connections with the DRV from independent minded South Vietnamese and the rest of the world. This was particularly important because many members of the NLF were not committed communists.

Guerrilla ideology was not without weakness and could be a double-edged sword when effectively discredited. Numerous Viet Cong defectors cited their loss of faith in the ideology as a motive for giving up the fight.

Psychological warfare -- employed to convince guerrillas that life was better on the other side -- and the effectiveness of advanced American weaponry were instrumental in producing this loss of faith.[140]

Rewards

Rewards for members of both movements were mostly of the intangible type. Other than rank or the "National Hero Award" (presented for acts of heroism) Partisan guerrillas had few rewards to win.[141] Viet Cong cadre members promised "not only glory, respect, freedom from want but adventure, education, jobs, land reform and an end to corruption in government."[142] Personal publicity during unit formations and dispatches could be won in both movements. For most, the respect and admiration of the primary group was all the guerrillas could really expect. The Viet Cong and Partisans appeared to fight without any type of pay. However, bounties (in the form of money or rice farms) were occasionally offered to Viet Cong guerrillas for the death or capture of enemy officers and Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) soldiers.[143]

Preconceptions of Combat

The Partisan and Viet Cong approaches to mitigating the shock, surprise and isolation that guerrillas experienced during their introduction to battle were uneven at best. While the strength of the primary group alleviated some of the stress from isolation, the shock and surprise of battle were difficult to overcome. Since training was situationally dependent, the task was made even more difficult. Lectures by leaders with combat experience were important and helped to some extent, but little could be done to prepare the guerrillas for the cataclysmic attacks of Panzers and Stukas or B-52s and helicopters. As with the conventional soldier, surviving the first big fight

was the guerilla's typical path to realistic expectations of combat.

Aspects of Combat

Partisan and Viet Cong guerrillas were burdened by the same basic aspects of combat that impact on conventional soldiers. However, the shortage of many basic supplies amplified these hardships. Partisan accounts of the war do not emphasize specific aspects of combat that diminished their will to fight, but weakness in the face of enemy air power and armor clearly disturbed them. Furthermore, Partisan accounts reveal a willingness to avoid combat with the better German units when appropriate. Elite German units called Jagdkommandos (Hunting Commandos) created significant problems for the guerrillas. Infiltrating deep into guerrilla sanctuaries, these units tracked the Partisans and vectored heavier combat units in for attacks.[144] The other Axis forces (particularly the Italians) did not appear to strike as much fear in the Partisans.

The threat of certain weapons appeared to have a greater impact than others on the Viet Cong guerrilla's will to fight. They experienced a feeling of helplessness when attacked by weapons they had little power to defeat. Fixed-wing aircraft and, to a lesser extent, helicopters and artillery were especially frightening to the guerrillas. The B-52 was particularly devastating to Viet Cong morale, not only because of its physical effects but almost as significantly because of surprise. These huge bombers flew so high that no warning preceded strikes. While the heavy casualties, shock and surprise inflicted by these weapons occurred most often in contact, the Viet Cong seldom felt safe knowing they could be hit anytime, anywhere, with no warning. Aircraft, with their killing and surveillance capabilities, constrained Viet Cong tactics and forced them to execute

exhausting evasive movements.[145]

While the threat always existed, Viet Cong guerrillas appeared to have far less fear of combat with enemy ground forces because they felt they had roughly equal capabilities.[146] The exceptions were units like LRRPs that actively hunted them.[147] A novelty of the war in Vietnam was the heavy employment of defoliants. The effects of these chemicals on crops, health and sanctuaries added to Viet Cong fears and feelings of helplessness.[148] Douglas Pike summarized how these aspects of combat affected the moral domain of the Viet Cong when he stated:

> The resulting sense of isolation was what distinguished the mentality of the guerrilla from that of the regular soldier; the psychology of the two was profoundly different. For the guerrilla there was no home front; the enemy, more numerous and powerful than he, was everywhere. The sense of being a hunted animal was never far below his level of consciousness. [149]

Combat Stress

Combat stress was an active factor in the moral domain of the guerrillas; however, it was mitigated by the nature of the way they fought. By design, protracted guerrilla warfare involved small numbers of pitched battles spread over long periods of time.[150] In practice the average Viet Cong unit was exposed to full-scale engagements only a few times a year. Thus most of the guerrillas avoided the stress of continuous combat.[151]

Once in battle, superior enemy firepower often inflicted what Moran called "commotional shock" and many Viet Cong were rendered ineffective (with many deserting) because of single traumatic engagements. Viet Cong leaders understood the effects of combat stress and tried to provide rest periods of 15 days or more to units involved in tough fighting. These rest periods emphasized the cadre in "raising the morale, mobilizing the spirit, or

correcting the thoughts of the fighters before an engagement or after a defeat."[152] The time allowed for rest and recuperation certainly contributed to the long-term endurance of the Viet Cong.

In the early stages of the Yugoslav resistance guerrilla tactics predominated, but in the later stages pitched battles along conventional lines grew in frequency. Fighting in larger organizations, Partisan units experienced longer battles with greater frequency than those experienced by the Viet Cong. Therefore, their exposure to combat stress was closer in nature to that experienced by conventional soldiers. However, unlike the Viet Cong or conventional soldiers, the voluntary nature of the Partisan movement allowed many guerrillas to retire when they were spent.

Combat Behavior.

Few would argue that Partisan and Viet Cong guerrillas often performed incredible acts of bravery in the face of formidable enemies. For the guerrilla, mere survival in pitched battles could be considered a victory of sorts. Depending on their tactical situation and mission, flight in the face of the enemy was not necessarily a cowardly act. However, this is not to say that the guerrillas did not demonstrate acts of cowardice; in many cases they did.

While the guerrilla's will to fight appears to have been heavily influenced by the previously mentioned factors, the self-preservation instinct inherent in most soldiers probably dominated his combat behavior. Whether conducting raids, executing ambushes or hiding in some form of sanctuary, guerrillas often fought as a means of survival. They often had no alternative when enemy air power and ground forces like LRRPs or Jagdkommandos could hunt them throughout the countryside.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The strongest conclusion of this monograph is that Kellett's factors affecting combat motivation do apply to the guerrilla. However, while the basic construct is applicable, the nature of some of the factors is significantly different.

In an holistic sense, the guerrilla's moral domain may be the single most important ingredient in their bid for victory. Unlike conventional warfare where armies can compensate (to some degree) for weaker wills with greater resources and technology, guerrilla warfare remains a people-intensive affair. War focused on the human element inevitably relies heavily on victory in the moral domain.

The role of the primary group is more important in guerrilla forces (particularly those employing the cell concept) than it is in most conventional armies. These basic building blocks form the bedrock upon which the entire guerrilla structure is created. The strength of the primary group is a critical factor in the resilience and endurance of the guerrilla. The creation of cohesive primary groups is almost an organizational imperative for guerrillas while conventional organizations can survive and win without the same emphasis.

The guerrilla's ideology, closely linked to esprit, plays a significant role in guerrilla armies. Indoctrination, emphasizing political ideology, is a salient feature of guerrilla training and plays a pivotal role in bringing the guerrilla to the battlefield. Focused by politically astute leaders, guerrilla esprit is generated from guerrilla ideology and group goals. In comparison, the esprit of conventional soldiers originates more from unit traditions and societal values than a conscious political orientation.

The transition from civilian to military life is different for the guerrilla because the mechanisms of change are less abrupt than those molding conventional soldiers. Furthermore, the socialization process in guerrilla armies cannot afford to be isolated from the populace because guerrilla movements depend heavily on civilian support.

In terms of manpower allocation the guerrilla sees his organization as far more homogenous than his conventional counterpart. Guerrilla leaders and supporting troops at all levels share the hardships of battle to a degree inconceivable in conventional armies. While senior guerrilla leaders may engage in fire fights, the senior leaders of conventional armies fight their wars from cities or command posts in relative security. Similarly, supporting troops in guerrilla organizations are never far from the effects of their antagonist's firepower.

A significant difference between the manpower allocation policies of guerrilla and conventional armies resides in the participation of women. Guerrilla armies have never hesitated to employ women directly in combat. Of interest is the fact that their presence strenghtened the resolve of some male guerrillas. The debate over the role of women in combat is beyond the scope of this paper; however, the fact that guerrilla forces actively and effectively employ females in combat roles differentiates this form of war.

While similarities exist between guerrilla and regular army emphasis on training, significant differences prevail. Guerrilla forces are limited by inferior training resources. This is particularly true of training facilities, equipment and ammunition. These differences can be mitigated if the training takes place in a secure area like a foreign country. Compared to most conventional organizations, ideological training receives vastly

greater attention in guerrilla armies.

Leadership and discipline are as important to the guerrilla as they are for regular soldiers. Leadership in guerrilla and conventional forces has nearly identical functions in combat. However, the guerrilla leader must rely on personal, up-front techniques required by infantry intensive tactics. Conventional light infantry leaders employ similar methods but the similarities drop off in units built around mechanization. Moreover, significant differences exist off the battlefield where guerrilla leaders play a greater role in the indoctrination, initial training and discipline of subordinates. Discipline rooted in primary group societal pressures affects the guerrilla in a manner similar to the way it impacts on the conventional soldier. However, the uneven enforcement of formal disciplinary action in guerrilla forces is different. Punishment for similar offenses can vary from subtle coercion and persuasion to execution.

Unlike his conventional counterpart, the guerrilla has little reason to expect any tangible rewards other than personal decorations. Intangible rewards in the from of recognition and the respect of the primary group are all he can hope for.

Despite differences in tactics, guerrillas and conventional soldiers endure similar experiences in relation to combat. Both suffer from unrealistic preconceptions of battle. These erroneous preconceptions usually remain until their first taste of combat. Hardships, fatigue, fear and isolation are active factors for both types of soldiering. However, guerrillas often struggle with the fear of engaging an enemy who possess weaponry against which they have few good defenses. Combat stress detracts from the will of both groups. Value conflicts that roam the soldier's psyche

are similar. Killing versus humanity, duty versus self-preservation and ideology versus reality burden the guerrilla and the regular. Perhaps the strength of ideology, combined with primary group dynamics and reinforced by a politicized cadre, gives the guerrilla an edge in overcoming stress.

Kellett's factors as well as most of the classical moral domain theory provide useful and valuable tools for the analysis of the guerrilla's moral domain. However, important issues reside in the implications for counterguerrilla doctrine.

V. IMPLICATIONS

To effectively counter guerrilla warfare, we must understand guerrilla strengths and vulnerabilities. From this monograph we can draw two implications about guerrilla vulnerabilities. The first implication involves ideology while the second involves technology. A third implication can be drawn from our doctrine's treatment of the guerrilla's moral domain.

Despite the great efforts that guerrilla leaders expend imbuing their soldiers with ideology, the guerrilla's faith in the cause can be broken. A traditional focus of psychological operations in counterguerrilla warfare is the subject of legitimacy. Legitimacy revolves around the citizenry's acceptance of their government or leadership. Historically, revolutionary guerrillas target this bond between the populace and the government they wish to replace. Conversely, the struggle for legitimacy and the guerrilla's dependence on the populace have tended to focus psychological operations of counterguerrilla warfare on separating the guerrilla from the people. While this is a useful endeavor, the guerrillas themselves should be attacked as well. Discrediting a movement's ideology appears to have extremely negative effects on the guerrilla's moral domain. Therefore a considerable portion of

psychological operations should be directed at breaking the guerrilla's belief in his (or her) cause.

Today our government is making hard choices in the area of weapons procurement. Conventional wisdom criticizes the wastefulness and lack of utility found in high technology weapons designed for the cold war. However, given the experience of the Viet Cong and Partisans, high technology weapons appear to have great utility in counterguerrilla warfare. High technology weapons have proved to have a degrading effect on guerrilla morale.

High technology systems -- stealth bombers, precision guided munitions and advanced reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) equipment -- could reward their users with high pay-offs when employed to threaten much of the sanctuary the guerrilla seeks. Like the B-52 and Stuka, skillful use of these weapons could devastate a guerrilla movement's moral domain. Furthermore, given the guerrilla's vulnerability to units like LRRPs and Jagdkommandos, the synergy of Special Operations Forces and precision guided weapons should be exploited. Inevitably the use of these weapons would be influenced by the specific nature of the guerrilla movement and the physical characteristics of the area of operations.

The guerrilla of course, will strive to avoid precision attacks by hugging population centers. However, these tactics cannot entirely avoid high technology precision strikes. While guerrillas may hide portions of their organization in urban areas, a move of this nature may constrain their activities and expose other vulnerabilities.

Doctrine derived from theory provides an army with a foundation for training and organization. Evolving doctrine is an army's mechanism of change. If we expect our counterguerrilla doctrine to be useful we must

ensure that it is fully imbued with the concepts of accepted theory. Therefore, moral domain theory should form part of the foundation of our counterguerrilla doctrine.

Army formations preparing for contingencies involving guerrilla warfare should look to Field Manual 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations as a point of departure. As written, the manual provides a multitude of tactics, techniques and procedures for fighting the guerrilla in the physical and cybernetic domains. The manual, however, pays scant attention to the will of the guerrilla in combat. For example, under the heading of "Motivation and discipline," FM 90-8 states:

> The guerrilla leaders are trained and motivated. They reinforce motivation within the guerrilla force through the immediate application of discipline. Usually the guerrilla is devoted to a cause almost to the point of fanaticism.[153]

The contents of this paragraph are indicative of the attention given to the moral domain of the guerrilla throughout the manual. Our current counterguerrilla doctrine's treatment of the moral domain is not sufficient. The implication is clear: our doctrine should explore vulnerabilities of the guerrilla's moral domain in greater detail.

No matter how convincingly our senior leaders state that we will carefully choose our wars, the prerogative will not belong to the military. In facing the challenges of the post - Cold War environment, our armed forces must maintain the capability to fight and win any form of conflict. Ubiquitous in recent history, guerrilla warfare deserves the attention of our military. Counterguerrilla tactics have already been explored in great detail by a myriad of theorists. However, victory in the moral domain may be the key to beating the guerrilla. The moral domain of the guerrilla has escaped close scrutiny and remains a fertile area for further study.

Appendix 1 (Organization of the People's Liberation Armed Force[154])



Appendix 2 (Three-by-Three Organization of PLA Main Force Units[155])



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[16]Ibid., 65.

[17]Ibid., 137.

[18]Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage (New York: Avery Publishing

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[19]Ibid., 61 and 53.

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[21]Ibid., 12.

[22]Ibid., 210.

[23]Kellett, 319.

[24]du Picq, 122.

[25]Kellett, 320-321.

[26]Marshall, 41.

[27]Ibid., 42.

[28]Ibid., 149.

[29]Kellett, 321.

[30]du Picq, 121.

[31]de Saxe, 241-242.

[32]Ibid., 194.

[33]Kellett, 322.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Clausewitz, 189.

[36]Ibid., 187-188.

[37]Ibid., 188.

[38]Ibid., 101.

[39]Moran, 71.

[40]Kellett, 323.

[41]Ibid., 324.

[42]Marshall, 23 and 41.

[43]Ibid., 50-54 and 132. Roger J. Spiller, the Deputy Director of the Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command And General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth Kansas, has done significant research on Marshall and his ratio of fire. While Spiller agrees with many of Marshall's theories, he persuasively disputes the validity of Marshall's ratio of fire. In particular, Spiller highlights evidence suggesting that Marshall made no systematic attempt to ask soldiers if they fired their weapons in an engagement. Furthermore, he points out that Marshall's personal correspondence and private conversations reveal an absence of comments on the ratio of fire. Roger J. Spiller, "S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire." RUSI Journal 133 (Winter 1988): 68. In another study directly related to Marshall's ratio of fire, Maj Russell W. Glenn conducted a survey of Vietnam veterans to determine if "American soldiers put out an effective volume of small arms fire" in Vietnam. Russell's research indicated that an average of greater than 80% of the soldiers in units fired their weapons during engagements in the Vietnam War. Russell W. Glenn, "Men Against Fire in Vietnam." (School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1987), 39.

[44]Ibid., 57 and 74-76.

[45]Du Picq, 195-199 and 264-286.

[46]Marshall, 81-83 and 134-136.

[47]Ibid., 133.

[48]Kellett, 327.

[49]Ibid., 326.

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[51]Ibid., 167.

[52]Kellett, 326.

[53]Marshall, 130.

[54]Kellett, 327-329.

[55]Marshall, 132; and du Picq, 183.

[56]Kellett, 327.

[57]Ibid.

[58]Ibid., 328.

[59]Ibid.

[60]de Saxe, 194-201.

[61]Kellett, 328-329.

[62]Ibid., 329-330.

[63]Clausewitz, 101.

[64]Ibid.

[65]Ibid. 122.

[66]Ibid.

[67]du Picq, 149.

[68]Ibid., 124.

[69]Ibid., 186.

[70]Moran, xvi; and Kellett, 331.

[71]Kellett, 330-331; Marshall, 211; and Moran, 152-153.

[72]Clausewitz, 106.

[73]Ibid., 105-107.

[74]du Picq, 66 and 120.

[75]Kellett, 331.

[76]Kellett, 331-332; and Marshall, 138.

[77]du Picq, 131; Marshall, 207; and Kellett, 332.

[78]Clausewitz, 101.

[79]du Picq, 65-66, 72-74 and 120-127.

[80]Moran, 3.

[81]Moran, xvi and 63 and; du Picq, 140.

[82]Ibid., 18-22 and 70-71.

[83]Marshall addresses variables that impact on the combat behavior of soldiers throughout his book. He specifically explains the effects of unrealistic expectations of battle on pages 36-37; isolation on pages 44-48; fear of killing on page 78; and communications on pages 100-101. Similar ideas are spread throughout du Picq's Battle Studies.

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[87]Ibid., 20-21.

[88]Rustin, 9.

[89]Phyllis Autey, "The Rise of Tito," in History of the Second World War, ed. Sir Basil Liddell Hart and Barrie Pitt (London: BPC Publishing Ltd., 1966), 1399-1400.

[90]Earl F. Ziemke, "Clearing the Balkans," in History of the Second World War, ed. Sir Basil Liddell Hart and Barrie Pitt (London: BPC Publishing Ltd., 1966), 2153.

[91]Ibid., 2153.

[92]HQ Department of the Army, Pamphlet 20-260, 49-50.

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